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In-Q-Tel: The Central Intelligence
Agency as Venture Capitalist
By John T. Reinert*
Abstract: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States’ principal
foreign intelligence and spy organization, chartered the first governmentsponsored venture capital firm, dubbed In-Q-Tel, in February 1999. In-Q-Tel
represents the twenty-first century fusion of U.S. spy efforts with the venture
capital industry. Envisioned as a platform to expand the research and
development (R&D) efforts of the CIA into the private sector, In-Q-Tel uses
CIA-supplied funds to make strategic investments in startup companies
developing commercially focused technologies that are of interest to the CIA
and greater intelligence community. This Comment contends that, although
R&D collaboration between the public and private sectors is vital and should be
encouraged, such collaboration should not be in the form of a venture capital
firm chartered and sponsored by the CIA. The CIA is not equipped to succeed in
the notoriously perilous business of venture capital, and heightened ethical
concerns surround the making of government-sponsored equity investments in
private companies.
Indeed, In-Q-Tel often invests in companies with
international operations, vicariously and unnecessarily exposing the CIA and
larger U.S. government to foreign entanglements. This Comment begins by
tracing relevant developments in the funding of U.S. spy efforts in Part II. Next,
Part III explores the venture capital industry, paying particular attention to the
interplay between venture capital and R&D. Part IV then analyzes the
relationship between the CIA and In-Q-Tel. Finally, Part V: (1) contends the
risks of In-Q-Tel currently outweigh its benefits; (2) suggests the current In-QTel model inappropriately exposes the CIA and larger U.S. government to
disputes arising from private international law; and (3) proposes alternative
courses of action by which the CIA may tap into the R&D efforts of the private
sector. Part VI concludes this Note.

* J.D., 2013, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Indiana University. I
thank my editors, especially Pat Disbennett and Topher Michail, for their insightful
comments and (almost) limitless patience. Special thanks also to Mike Molitor, whose
thoughtful review of an early draft helped immensely.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States’ principal
foreign intelligence and spy organization, chartered the first governmentsponsored venture capital firm, dubbed In-Q-Tel, in February 1999.1
Envisioned as a platform to expand the research and development (R&D)
efforts of the CIA into the private sector, In-Q-Tel’s mission is “to identify,
adapt, and deliver innovative technology solutions to support the missions
of the Central Intelligence Agency and broader U.S. Intelligence
Community.”2
Under the In-Q-Tel model, the CIA provides investment capital and
1

BUS. EXEC. FOR NAT’L SEC., ACCELERATING THE ACQUISITION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR INTELLIGENCE: THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL ON THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN-Q-TEL VENTURE 6 (C. Lawrence Meador et al. eds.,
2001), available at http://www.iqt.org/attachments/BENS%20Report.pdf [hereinafter BENS
REPORT].
2
IQT
Corporate
Fact
Sheet,
IN-Q-TEL,
http://www.iqt.org/mission/IQT%20Corporate%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 2,
2011).
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identifies “pressing problems.”3 Tasked with finding solutions to these
unclassified problems,4 In-Q-Tel turns to the private sector and makes
“strategic . . . investments in startup companies that have developed
commercially focused technologies that will provide strong, near-term
advantages (within 36 months) to the [intelligence community’s] mission.”5
Through the investment process, In-Q-Tel becomes a shareholder of these
portfolio companies.6
Within a few years of In-Q-Tel’s formation, other government entities
also looking to bridge the gap between the R&D efforts of the public and
private sectors followed the CIA’s lead and set up similar ventures to invest
in unclassified commercial technology. For instance, the Army chartered
OnPoint Technologies to “back technology designed to produce lighterweight and longer-lasting energy sources for soldiers.”7 According to the
Army’s chief scientist, A. Michael Andrews, “[f]inding new energy sources
for soldiers is akin to a search for better power solutions for handheld
computers like Palm Pilots, BlackBerries, personal digital assistants and
cell phones. Lighter and smaller is better.”8 Not long after the founding of
OnPoint Technologies, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) chartered Red Planet Capital—a name that reflects NASA’s longterm goal of sending astronauts to Mars—to invest in emerging
technologies “that NASA might be able to use” in the future.9 NASA’s
manager for the project, Lisa L. Lockyer, explained: “NASA could see that
a lot of technical innovation is coming out of companies that don’t
traditionally do business with the government, and we wanted better and
3
GEORGE TENET WITH BILL HARLOW, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE
CIA 26 (2007).
4
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
5
IQT Mission, IN-Q-TEL, http://www.iqt.org/about/mission.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2013).
6
As one commentator noted, In-Q-Tel:

[C]an make either an equity investment, where it receives part ownership in the
company, or a work program investment. Work programs typically provide
funding for a company to develop its technology in a way that suits [Intelligence
Community] needs.
For example, if a company has developed a new
communications antenna, but the CIA needs that antenna to be 50 percent smaller,
it could make a work program investment to help fund that reduction in size.
Typically, In-Q-Tel makes both equity and work program investments.
Andrew S. Mara, Maximizing the Returns of Government Venture Capital Programs, DEF.
HORIZONS (Nat’l Def. Univ./Inst. for Nat’l Strategic Studies, D.C.), no. 71, Jan.2011, at 2,
available at http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DH%2071.pdf.
7
Deals & Deal Makers—Memo to Techies: This Army Wants Your Energy Ideas, WALL
ST. J., May 9, 2003, at C5.
8
Id.
9
Marc Kaufman, NASA Invests in Its Future with Venture Capital Firm, WASH. POST,
Oct. 31, 2006, at A19.
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faster access to that creativity.”10 Even the U.S. Postal Service, faced with a
projected loss of $7 billion for fiscal year 2010, expressed interest in the InQ-Tel model.11 Commenting on the projected loss, Louis Atkins, executive
vice president of the National Association of Postal Supervisors, declared
the Postal Service “lacks the vision, resources and know-how [to] generate
additional revenue in innovative ways.”12 His solution: “The Postal Service
needs its own In-Q-Tel to achieve the same leverage that connects
technology advances to improvements in communications, including going
beyond hard-copy mail itself.”13
Although collaboration between the R&D efforts of the public and
private sectors is vital and should be encouraged, this Comment contends
that such collaboration should not be in the form of a venture capital firm
chartered and sponsored by the CIA. The CIA is not equipped to succeed in
the notoriously perilous business of venture capital, and heightened ethical
concerns surround the making of government-sponsored equity investments
in private companies. Indeed, In-Q-Tel often invests in companies with
international operations, vicariously and unnecessarily exposing the CIA
and larger U.S. government to foreign entanglements.
This Comment traces relevant developments in the funding of U.S. spy
efforts in Part II. Next, Part III explores the venture capital industry, paying
particular attention to the interplay between venture capital and R&D. Part
IV then analyzes the relationship between the CIA and In-Q-Tel. Finally,
Part V: (1) argues the risks of In-Q-Tel currently outweigh the benefits; (2)
suggests the current In-Q-Tel model inappropriately exposes the CIA and
larger U.S. government to disputes arising from private international law;
and (3) proposes alternative courses of action by which the CIA may tap
into the R&D efforts of the private sector. Part VI concludes this
Comment.
II. FUNDING U.S. SPY EFFORTS: THE ORIGINS OF IN-Q-TEL
While the concept of a CIA-sponsored venture capital firm may seem
odd, such an initiative derives from the exceptionally broad discretion
granted to the U.S. intelligence community regarding the use of funds since
1775. This Part accordingly provides an historical context by which In-QTel may be examined.

10

Id.
Joe Davidson, Postal Service Desperate for Good Ideas, WASH. POST, June 23, 2010,
at B03.
12
Id.
13
Id.
11
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A. Early History: 1775–1947
The historical context surrounding In-Q-Tel’s development traces back
to November 29, 1775. In the midst of the Revolutionary War, the Second
Continental Congress created the Committee of Secret Correspondence “for
the sole purpose of corresponding with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland,
and other parts of the world.”14 Recognizing such a group would require
funding as well as the discretionary authority to expend funds as it deemed
fit, Congress resolved “to defray all such expenses as may arise by carrying
on such correspondence, and for the payment of such agents as they may
send on this service.”15 Called “the distant ancestor of today’s CIA”16 by
one historian, the Committee, chaired by Benjamin Franklin,17 carried out
various foreign intelligence missions as assigned by Congress. On May 18,
1776, for example, Congress directed the Committee “to endeavour to
discover the designs of the French in assembling so large a fleet, with so
great a number of troops, in the West Indies, and whether they mean to act
for or against America.”18
The members of the Committee of Secret Correspondence were not the
only spies serving the revolutionary cause. Indeed, George Washington
employed “an elaborate network of spies in the colonies.”19 But the
Committee is remarkable in that it was given exceptionally broad
discretionary authority to expend funds with little or no reporting to
Congress.20 This may seem an unusual grant of power in the context of the
founding of a democratic, pluralistic republic. However, as Ben Franklin
and other members of the Committee put it: “We find, by fatal experience,
the Congress consists of too many members to keep secrets.”21 Almost two
14
2 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS, FROM THE FIRST
MEETING THEREOF TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONFEDERATION, BY THE ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 5–6 (Thomas B. Wait 1820) [hereinafter SECRET
JOURNALS].
15
Id. at 5.
16
CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EYES ONLY: SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 7 (1995).
17
Denys P. Myers, Legislatures and Foreign Relations, 11 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 643, 676
(1917).
18
SECRET JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 6.
19
Robert M. Gates, Intelligence, Democracy, and Freedom, 22 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
231, 231 (1992).
20
See, e.g., Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(“The Committee exercised broad discretionary power to conduct intelligence activities
independent of the Continental Congress and to safeguard the secrecy of matters pertaining
to its agents, though Congress asserted greater direct control following the Declaration of
Independence. It is especially remarkable that the Committee was in a position to insist upon
secrecy even against Congress, which functioned both as the legislative and the executive
power at this time and exercised control over foreign affairs.”).
21
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE

681

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:677 (2013)

centuries later, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 would grant
similar deference to the CIA.22
George Washington’s contributions to the development and funding of
U.S. spy efforts did not end with the Revolutionary War. On January 8,
1790, during a speech to Congress that would be remembered as the first
State of the Union address,23 President Washington requested “a competent
fund designated for defraying the expenses incident to the conduct of our
foreign affairs.”24 On July 1, 1790, Congress responded by creating the
Contingent Fund of Foreign Intercourse, known informally as the Secret
Service Fund.25 Congress authorized the President “to draw from the
treasury of the United States . . . a sum not exceeding forty thousand dollars
annually” to finance intelligence operations.26 The Act included an annual
reporting provision, but Congress required the President to account only for
expenditures from the fund “as in his judgment may be made public.”27 On
February 9, 1793, Congress clarified the reporting provision by requiring
the President to certify expenditures from the fund. Significantly, Congress
declared “every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the
sums or sums therein expressed to have been expended.”28 Thus, while
President Washington had to certify the sums spent from the fund, he could
“conceal both the purposes and recipients of payments.”29
Although the Contingent Fund remained in use by U.S. Presidents
until the mid-twentieth century,30 the operations it funded consisted of “ad
hoc efforts.”31 This would change during World War II,32 when President
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FIRST TO THE SECOND
SESSION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS 568 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834).
22
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, ch. 227, 68 Stat. 208 (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. § 403 (2006)).
23
See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 20 at 158 (describing President Washington’s address
as “the precursor to the ‘State of the Union’ message. . .”).
24
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 969–70 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
25
ANDREW, supra note 16, at 11.
26
Act of July 1, 1790, ch. 22, § 1, 1790 FIRST CONG. 128-29 (providing the means of
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations).
27
Id.
28
Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, § 2, 1793 SECOND CONG. 299–30 (continuing “in force for a
limited time,” and amending “An act providing the means of intercourse between the United
States and foreign nations”).
29
ANDREW, supra note 16, at 11.
30
See, e.g., Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 158–59 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (“The contingent fund remained in continuous use by the President throughout the
nineteenth century and up to the creation of the CIA in the mid-twentieth century.”).
31
Gates, supra note 19, at 232.
32
See Edward F. Sayle, The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, 1 J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1 (1986) (discussing the
development of U.S. intelligence efforts between the Revolutionary War and World War II).
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Franklin D. Roosevelt created the United States’ first centralized
intelligence agency—the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—in order to
coordinate wartime intelligence efforts.33
Roosevelt named William J. Donovan to lead the OSS. An influential
New York lawyer34 and a recipient of the Medal of Honor,35 Donovan
would become known as the “founder of modern American intelligence”36
for his innovative approach to OSS operations. Instead of building OSS
manpower solely with military staff, Donovan recruited gifted civilians
with seemingly unrelated talents. Robert M. Gates, who led the CIA from
1991 to 1993, commented: “Donovan’s greatest legacy to American
intelligence was that he brought talented people from all walks of life into
the national security business: people like prominent Harvard historian
William Langer, jazz musician Miles Copeland, filmmaker John Ford,
baseball player Mo Berg, and future chef Julia Child.”37 Fifty years after
the OSS turned to talented civilians for assistance with its wartime mission,
the CIA would take Donovan’s approach one step further with In-Q-Tel.
While Donovan had recruited civilians to join the OSS, In-Q-Tel would
invest CIA money in technology-focused private-sector startups.
As World War II drew to a close, uncertainty surrounded the future of
U.S. intelligence efforts. In September 1945, shortly after the ending of
hostilities with Japan, President Harry S. Truman shut down the OSS and
effectively cut off funding for intelligence operations.38 “Americans had
believed that their country was guided by uniquely high ethical principles,”
wrote historian Christopher Andrew in 1995.39 “They regarded peacetime
espionage, if they thought of it at all, as a corrupt outgrowth of Old War
diplomacy, alien to the open and upright American way.”40 The Cold War,
however, would finally “persuade them otherwise.”41
The charismatic Donovan sought to be a driving force in that

33
Jennifer Davis Heaps, Tracking Intelligence Information: The Office of Strategic
Services, 61 AM. ARCHIVIST 287, 289 (1998).
34
A Look Back: Gen. William J. Donovan Heads Office of Strategic Services, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/gen.william-j.-donovan-heads-oss.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
35
See William J. Donovan, A Plea for State Regulation, 159 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 76, 83 (1932) (“William J. Donovan . . . was the only man in the World War who
received every decoration in the power of the United States to give: the Congressional Medal
of Honor, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Distinguished Service Cross.”).
36
Gates, supra note 19, at 232.
37
Id. at 233.
38
ANDREW, supra note 16, at 160.
39
Id. at 29.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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persuasion, but he faced resistance from President Truman.42
Consequently, Donovan took his campaign directly to the public. Speaking
to the Bar Association of New York City in February 1947, Donovan
advocated for the permanent establishment and funding of coordinated
intelligence efforts. The work of an intelligence agency, he explained, is
not “mysterious” or “sinister”—it simply entails “pulling together myriad
facts, making a pattern of them, and drawing inferences from that
pattern.”43 After addressing his audience’s fears of a peacetime intelligence
agency, Donovan argued the United States “should have a Central
Intelligence Agency, headed by a civilian with no allegiance to any
governmental department, to collate and coordinate all of the information
received in this country.”44 A few months later, with the hostilities of the
Cold War beginning “in earnest,”45 Donovan won the debate.
B. Formation of the CIA and In-Q-Tel: 1947–1999
The National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA “[f]or the purpose
of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government
departments and agencies in the interest of national security.”46 The newly
formed CIA drew many of its first officers from the ranks of the former
OSS.47 Two years later, with the CIA formally established and staffed, the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 further clarified issues related to
the CIA’s administration.48
While the Central Intelligence Agency Act addressed the future of a
new government agency, it reflected the prior development of American
spy efforts. Echoing the broad grant of discretionary power made by the
Second Continental Congress to Ben Franklin and the Committee of Secret
Correspondence, the Act grants the CIA the expansive authority to expend
funds “for purposes necessary to carry out [the CIA’s] functions.”49 And
the reporting requirements of the Act mirror the language used by Congress
at the end of the eighteenth century. Just as Congress in 1793 had required
a simple “certificate”50 of the sums spent from the Contingent Fund with no
42
See, e.g., ANDREW, supra note 16, at 156–61; see also AGOSTINO VON HASSELL &
SIGRID MACRAE, ALLIANCE OF ENEMIES: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE SECRET AMERICAN AND
GERMAN COLLABORATION TO END WORLD WAR II 292–95 (2006).
43
U.S. Intelligence Held Inadequate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1947, at 6.
44
Id.
45
ANDREW, supra note 16, at 168.
46
National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, § 102(d), 61 Stat. 496, 498 (current version at
50 U.S.C. § 403-4(b) (2006)).
47
See Gates, supra note 19, at 233.
48
Cent. Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, ch. 227, § 8(a), 68 Stat. 208, 212 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 403(j) (2006)).
49
Id.
50
Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 299, 300 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3526 (2006)).
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need for an explanation of the purposes or recipients, the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 required the same for the CIA’s
expenditures.51 Both acts even conclude with the same sentence: “[E]very
such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher.”52 Thus, with the
Central Intelligence Agency Act, Congress “merely continued a
longstanding practice of secret expenditures for foreign intelligence
matters.”53
Although the CIA of the Cold War era derived from its predecessor of
the Revolutionary War era, it also broke new ground—especially with
respect to the role of R&D. The CIA began to view R&D and the
technology it produced as a significant contributor to CIA’s overall mission.
The U-2 reconnaissance plane, the SR-71 reconnaissance plane, and the
Corona spy satellite program emerged from this new focus on funding
cutting-edge R&D programs.54 Indeed, in recognition of their technological
feats during the Cold War, the members of the CIA’s Directorate of Science
and Technology earned the nickname the “Wizards of Langley”55—a
reference to the CIA’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia.
But the end of the Cold War would challenge the need for the CIA’s
continued existence,56 not to mention the funding of its expensive R&D
programs.57 Indeed, when he began his tenure as Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI)58 in July 1997, George Tenet took the helm of a CIA that
faced an identity crisis. The Cold War no longer served as the justification
for the CIA’s mission and massive budget. “During the 1990s,” recalled
Tenet in 2007, “the conventional wisdom was that we had won the cold war
and it was time to reap the peace dividend.”59 As a result, the federal
government slashed the CIA’s budget and workforce.60 In Tenet’s view,
51

50 U.S.C. § 403(j)(b).
Id.; Act of Feb. 9, 1793 § 2.
53
Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
54
See Rick E. Yannuzzi, In-Q-Tel: A New Partnership between the CIA and the Private
Sector, 9 DEF. INTELLIGENCE J. 25, 26 (2000).
55
See generally JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, THE WIZARDS OF LANGLEY: INSIDE THE CIA’S
DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (2001).
56
Gates, supra note 19, at 234 (“[A] handful of voices question[ed] the need for
intelligence in a post-Soviet, post-Cold War world . . . .”).
57
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 25–26.
58
George John Tenet, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/centerfor-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/directors-and-deputydirectors-of-central-intelligence/tenet.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2013).
In a 2004
restructuring of the intelligence community, the position of Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) replaced the position of DCI. History of the CIA, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/history-of-the-cia/index.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2013).
59
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 14.
60
Id. As Tenet recalled: “The entire intelligence community, not just CIA, lost billions
52
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“the supposed ‘peace dividend’ was devastating to the spy business at a
time when its vitality was most needed.”61 As a result, morale at the CIA
was low. Worse, as the fifth DCI in only seven years, Tenet realized the
CIA faced the “critical problem” of “episodic leadership.”62
The state of the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology had also
deteriorated, as the rise of the internet age challenged the CIA’s
preeminence in the area of R&D. “As limited as our human resources were
when I took over as DCI in 1997,” wrote Tenet, “our technological capacity
might have been even worse.”63 As he put it, the CIA had once been a
“giant” in the area of science and technology, but “the dot-com revolution
was passing us by. Private-sector technology was far outstripping our
ability to keep pace with our targets.”64
In one of his first moves as DCI, Tenet launched a strategic direction
study to address these problems and assess how the CIA should approach
(and fund) twenty-first century operations.65 Not surprisingly, “[t]he study
made a direct link between the Agency’s future technology investments and
improving its information gathering and analysis capabilities.”66 At that
time, it had become apparent that technology would play a major role in the
new landscape faced by the CIA—not the space-age military technology
developed in secret labs for the Cold War, but information technology (IT)
and computer systems developed by young entrepreneurs for the
commercial marketplace. Writing for Foreign Affairs in 1990, for example,
one commentator observed that “American intelligence analysts now have
to cope with a torrent of information and data. Amid an exponential
proliferation of satellites and fiber optics, interlinked computers and data
bases . . . these analysts are becoming information junkies.”67
He
concluded: “If effectively harnessed and channeled, then astutely exploited,
this new information and data flood can dramatically improve the quality
and accuracy of American intelligence assessments and estimates . . . but it
creates new complexities as fast as it clarifies old mysteries.”68
The CIA under Tenet faced the serious problem of how to deal with
these new complexities. A novel approach suggested by Dr. Ruth David,
the head of the Directorate of Science and Technology, caught Tenet’s

of dollars in funding. Our workforce was slashed by almost 25 percent.” Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 25–26.
64
Id. at 16.
65
Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 25.
66
Id.
67
George A. Carver, Jr., Intelligence in the Age of Glasnost, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 147, 159
(1990).
68
Id.
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eye.69 David proposed that the CIA outsource a portion of its R&D efforts
to the private sector.70 After all, according to one former CIA official, “[a]s
an information-based agency, the CIA must be at the cutting edge of
information technology in order to maintain its competitive edge and
provide its customers with intelligence that is both timely and relevant.”71
The problem, according to the official, was “the CIA did not, and could not,
compete for IT innovation and talent with the same speed and agility that
those in the commercial marketplace, whose businesses are driven by
‘Internet time’ and profit, could.”72
After much discussion within the CIA and talks with leaders in the
private sector,73 the concept of a CIA-backed venture capital firm charged
with “harness[ing] the brilliance of young innovators in the IT industry”74
came to fruition. While the concept was new, it fit within the exceptionally
broad discretion granted to the intelligence community since 1775.75
The CIA approached Norman Augustine, the former chief executive
officer (CEO) of the aerospace and defense company Lockheed Martin, to
serve as the firm’s founder, since Augustine had “the experience and
passion necessary to start the Corporation.”76 Augustine accepted.77 In
February 1999, the CIA chartered In-Q-Tel78 as “a private, independent,
nonprofit corporation”79 incorporated in Delaware.80 The original corporate
charter described In-Q-Tel’s mission as follows: “[T]o exploit and develop
new and emerging information technologies and pursue R&D that produce
innovative solutions to the most difficult problems facing the CIA and
Intelligence Community.”81 A month later, In-Q-Tel received its first
contract from the CIA.82 Thus, concluded a former CIA official, “In-Q-Tel
was in business.”83
In-Q-Tel represents the twenty-first century fusion of U.S. spy efforts
with the venture capital industry. The broad grant of discretionary authority
69

TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 26.
Id.
71
Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 26.
72
Id. at 27.
73
Id. at 26.
74
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 26.
75
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 31.
76
Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 26.
77
Id.
78
The initial name of the corporation was Peleus; it was soon changed to In-Q-It and
finally to In-Q-Tel. BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
79
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 26.
80
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
81
Id.
82
Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 26.
83
Id.
70
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afforded to the CIA traces directly to the Committee of Secret
Correspondence. Today, the Director of the CIA is enabled under a
statutory catchall provision to “perform such other functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the
Director of National Intelligence may direct.”84 The provision mirrors the
language used by Congress in 1775. The similarly broad grant of power to
the CIA to expend funds with little or no reporting requirements traces back
to George Washington’s “competent fund”—the Contingent Fund of
Foreign Intercourse. Today, the CIA’s funds “may be expended without
regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of
Government funds.”85 Lastly, the decision by the CIA to approach the
private sector to tap into civilian ingenuity traces to William Donovan’s
innovative approach to staffing the OSS.86
Thus, the CIA’s decision to form In-Q-Tel fit within the parameters for
funding intelligence operations established more than two centuries ago.
However, In-Q-Tel also brought the CIA into the unchartered territory of
venture capital—a business model this Comment will now discuss.
III. VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
When the Second Continental Congress created the Committee of
Secret Correspondence in 1775 and thereby paved the way for the CIA, the
modern venture capital industry did not exist.87 The concept of a market for
equity investments, whereby an investor exchanges capital for an ownership
stake in a company and is then able to trade that stake with other investors,
had been around since 1602, when the Dutch East India Company made the
first initial public offering (IPO) of corporate stock.88 But the first real
venture capital firm did not come to existence until more than three
centuries later, when a group of investors, led by the president of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a professor at Harvard Business
School, founded American Research and Development (ARD) in 1946.89
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Although the success of ARD’s investments “ranged widely,”90 the firm
gained notoriety when its initial investment of $70,000 in Digital
Equipment Company in 1957 ballooned to a reported value of $355 million
upon the company’s IPO about a decade later.91 From the ARD model
grew the modern venture capital industry.92
A. Venture Capital in the United States
Today, private-sector venture capital fund managers (i.e., venture
capital firms) serve as “financial intermediaries between sources of funds
(typically institutional investors) and high-growth and high-tech
entrepreneurial firms”93 that otherwise have limited access to capital.94 The
fund managers often play “a significant role in enhancing the value of their
entrepreneurial investments as they provide financial, administrative,
marketing, and strategic advice.”95 In order to play such a leading role,
venture capital fund managers usually take relatively large equity positions
in their portfolio companies and exert high-level control.96 Indeed,
according to the National Venture Capital Association: “Venture capital
partners become actively engaged with a company, typically taking a board
seat. With a startup, daily interaction with the management team is
common.”97
The goal of the venture capital firm is to “grow the company to a point
where it can go public or be acquired by a larger corporation (called an
‘exit’) at a price that far exceeds the amount of capital invested.”98
90
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& CORP. CHANGE 579–616 (2005).
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Typically, the investment is held for multiple years before the exit.99 For
their highly specialized services, venture capital fund managers are
compensated with an annual management fee (generally 2% of the fund’s
committed capital) plus a performance fee called “carried interest”
(generally 20% of capital gains from the exit sales of the fund’s
investments).100 This compensation structure is known colloquially as “2
and 20.”101
The unusual taxation of the 2 and 20 structure has recently become the
subject of intense political debate.102 “The general partners [of a venture
capital fund] typically claim the 2% fee as compensation, so it’s subject to
ordinary income and payroll taxes,” notes the Wall Street Journal.103 “But
they often classify the 20% share of profits—where the big money can be—
as an investment producing a capital gain or loss.”104 The difference is
important because the highest tax rate applied to capital gains is slightly
more than half the highest rate applied to ordinary income.105
But not all venture capital firms earn huge profits. Indeed, many are
not profitable at all. The venture capital market is notoriously complex and
challenging, and success is rare.106 The National Venture Capital
Association cautions: “Approximately one-third of portfolio companies
[held by venture capital funds] fail, so those that do succeed must do so in a
big way.”107 Otherwise, the fund managers will run out of capital as
investors move to other managers. On the other hand, successful venture
capital firms and other financial intermediaries continue to attract investors.
Indeed, “[m]any recent . . . funds have capital exceeding $1 billion (and a
few exceeding $10 billion).”108 The success of these firms traces in large
part to the industry’s ability to attract the best and brightest with the
potential to obtain substantial compensation under the 2 and 20 model.109
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B. Strategic Venture Capital and Recent Government Projects
As the CIA grew in influence within the U.S. government, its staff did
not miss the concurrent rising influence of the financial sector. When the
National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA, the financial sector
contributed 2.3% to U.S. gross domestic product.110 By 2007 that figure
had increased by almost four times to 8.1%.111 “In other words,” observed
historian Niall Ferguson, “approximately $1 of every $13 paid to employees
in the United States now went to people working in finance.”112
Commenting on this trend, one CIA official concluded “the flow of capital
and talent has irresistibly moved to the commercial sector, where the
prospect of huge profits from initial public offerings and equity-based
compensation has become the norm.”113
While venture capital is primarily considered a profit-driven
industry,114 its “unique link between finance and innovation”115 also
positions it to function as a sort of incubator for R&D. Indeed, for the past
few decades, a handful of corporations have made strategic venture capital
investments in promising start-ups as part of broader attempts to
supplement internal R&D efforts.116 Under this model, generating profits
often takes a back seat to fueling innovation. Whereas the strictly financial
model seeks to buy stakes in the start-ups that will generate the highest
profits from large growth, the strategic model primarily seeks to buy stakes
in start-ups that will generate relevant new technology. Through the
investment process, the strategic venture capitalist hopes to gain early
access to cutting-edge technology.
Although it is difficult to assess the overall success of strategic venture
capital investments with respect to R&D, a 2000 study published by the
prominent think tank RAND concluded “a dollar of venture capital appears
to be about three times more potent in stimulating patenting than a dollar of
traditional corporate R&D.”117 The study suggested “venture capital, even
though it averaged less than 3% of corporate R&D from 1983 to 1992, is
responsible for a much greater share—about 8%—of U.S. industrial
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innovations in this decade.”118
The U.S. federal government paid careful attention to the rising role
played by venture capital in the context of R&D.119 Seeking to act as a
catalyst for innovation, the government created the Advanced Technology
Program (ATP) in 1990.120 From 1990 to 2007, ATP provided “research
funding to universities and colleges, government-owned laboratories, and
for-profit enterprises.”121 As a public-private partnership, ATP funded
projects that promised commercial applications and broad economic
benefits.122 Although not a venture capital firm itself, ATP sought to
produce a “halo effect”123 with the investments it made in order to draw the
attention of private-sector venture capital funds, thus encouraging the
private-sector funds to invest.
In 2007, the Technology Innovation Program124 (TIP) replaced the
Advanced Technology Program.125 Although TIP is a continuation of what
has been termed “public venture capital,”126 TIP broadens the scope of
funding to include “high-risk, high-reward, transformative research, . . .
targeted to key societal challenges that are not being addressed
elsewhere.”127 TIP defines a societal challenge as “a problem or issue
confronted by society that when not addressed could negatively affect the
overall function and quality of life of the Nation and as such justifies
government attention.”128 To address such challenges, TIP “works closely
with the private sector to understand where private resources are not
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available.”129 When private resources are not available to address a societal
challenge, TIP may step in to provide funding.
Reviews of ATP and TIP have been mixed, with some finding such
programs successful130 and others finding them unsuccessful.131 Supporters
often argue that funding entrepreneurial ventures “will transform depressed
economic regions, generate innovation, and create jobs.”132 This notion,
according to opponents, “may be politically appealing, but . . . is naïve.”133
A 2005 study prepared for the Department of Homeland Security identifies
the source of tension. The report advises that while “[s]tructuring venture
capital activity within the private sector is challenging enough,”134 the
participation of the government poses even greater challenges, since
“[f]ederal agencies do not normally run businesses, make commercial
investments, or develop commercial products.”135 Beyond the practical
challenges of the government participating in an industry as unfamiliar as
venture capital, critics argue such programs cause “an erosion in political
accountability, [which is] a crucial element in democratic governance.”136
In 1999, amid the backdrop of this debate, the CIA took the concept of
government-backed, strategic venture capital investing to a new level.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CIA AND IN-Q-TEL
Unlike TIP, which is a public-private partnership that functions more
as a pool of government grant money than a venture capital fund, In-Q-Tel
is arguably a true, independent venture capital firm. This Part examines the
In-Q-Tel model more closely.
A. What Is In-Q-Tel?
Shortly after In-Q-Tel opened for business, an article in the Los
Angeles Daily Journal described the partnership between the firm and the
CIA as “an out-of-the-box marriage between the federal government and
129
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Silicon Valley.”137 As the writer put it, “This is a tale of James Bond meets
venture capitalist.”138 True, the CIA wanted to play up the mystique of
James Bond—the “Q” in the firm’s name, placed between “Intel”
(shorthand for “Intelligence”), refers to James Bond’s fictional inventor of
high-tech spy gear and other gadgets.139 However, characterizing In-Q-Tel
solely as a venture capital firm is somewhat inaccurate. Indeed, In-Q-Tel
has variously (and correctly) been called a “technology accelerator,”140 a
“private nonprofit venture capital company,”141 as well as “the ‘venture
capital arm’ of the CIA.”142 Reflecting its focus on R&D, In-Q-Tel refers to
itself as a “strategic investment firm.”143
But the best definition of In-Q-Tel’s business model is supplied by an
independent report prepared by Business Executives for National Security
(BENS), an organization that fosters an exchange of ideas between the
private and public sectors.144 “In-Q-Tel has been mischaracterized as a
private venture capital firm,” observes the 2001 report.145 “More
precisely . . . In-Q-Tel is an evolving blend of various business, nonprofit,
and government research and development (R&D) models. It is most
analogous to a corporate strategic venture capital entity—like those
maintained by major technology firms.”146 The BENS report notes that,
while profit is important, In-Q-Tel primarily “seeks enhanced innovation,
earlier discovery of relevant technologies, and more direct information on
market developments.”147
Regardless of the label, the important point is that In-Q-Tel, legally
independent of the CIA, makes equity investments in private-sector firms
using government-supplied funds. In the years prior to In-Q-Tel’s
formation, many observers had called for the CIA and the broader
intelligence community to do some “radical rethinking about its missions
137

Leslie A. Gordon, Venturing Out, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 13, 2000, at S10.
Id.
139
Id.; Neil King, Jr., With a Nod to 007, the CIA Sets Up Firm to Invest in High Tech,
WALL
ST.
J.,
April
3,
2000,
at
A1, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB954709328708352542search.html?KEYWORDS=Neil+King+Jr&COLLECTION=wsjie/6month.
140
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at viii.
141
Amy Cortese, Suddenly, Uncle Sam Wants to Bankroll You, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2001, at 1.
142
Terence O’Hara, In-Q-Tel, CIA’s Venture Arm, Invests in Secrets, WASH. POST, Aug.
15,
2005,
at
D01,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/08/14/AR2005081401108.html.
143
IQT Corporate Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
144
About BENS, BUS. EXEC. FOR NAT’L SEC., http://www.bens.org/page.aspx?pid=406
(last visited Jan. 23, 2013).
145
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at viii.
146
Id. at viii–ix.
147
Id.
138

694

In-Q-Tel
33:677 (2013)

and the approaches, methods and techniques employed in discharging
them.”148 As the first government-sponsored venture capital firm, In-Q-Tel
was certainly radical.
One of the driving factors in this radical new structuring was the
concern that it would be nearly impossible for traditional CIA staffers to
bridge the gap between the culture of the CIA and the culture of Silicon
Valley. “We had to find a way to harness the brilliance of young innovators
in the IT industry,” recalled George Tenet.149 The problem was that “[t]o
them, we were their fathers: stiff, buttoned up, wearing suits. They wanted
nothing to do with us. We needed to bridge that generation gap.”150
In its first move to create a generation-bridging familiar face, the CIA
decided to charter In-Q-Tel as an independent entity, since it would then be
able “to operate in the market place on equal footing with its commercial
peers and with the speed and agility that the IT world demands.”151 The
government, reasoned the CIA, is generally too sluggish to attract the
attention of many innovators.152
Next, In-Q-Tel needed a CEO with credibility in Silicon Valley, where
many of In-Q-Tel’s investments would be made. Gilman Louie, a
charismatic thirty-nine-year-old video game developer153 who had just sold
his own company for millions,154 seemed to fit the bill. Louie, according to
the Washington Post, is “a genuine Silicon Valley entrepreneur, who started
his first company in his mother’s garage in San Francisco when he was
22.”155
After assuming his position as CEO, Louie went to work bridging the
generation gap. He noted approvingly that, although In-Q-Tel and the CIA
would be partners, In-Q-Tel would “not [be] tied to the CIA’s
organizational style and structure.”156 Elaborating on this point, Louie
commented: “Because In-Q-Tel is a private company, we will be able to
work in Internet time and structure ourselves in a manner that will be
familiar to many of the information technology companies we hope to
attract as partners.”157
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At the announcement of In-Q-Tel’s formation in September 1999,
Louie formally assumed his role as spokesman for the new venture. “In
many ways,” he declared, “the needs of business and the CIA are quickly
converging.”158 Accordingly, the CIA and In-Q-Tel would “look for ways
to find answers to similar problems.”159 Louie concluded: “In-Q-Tel will
work to be the bridge that will allow our brightest minds to work on some
of our nation’s toughest problems to foster creativity.”160
B. How In-Q-Tel Works
Critics of hybrid organizations such as In-Q-Tel “tend to consider the
governmental and private sectors as being legally distinct, with relatively
little overlap in behavioral norms.”161 Yet, this is the point of In-Q-Tel: the
CIA recognizes the public and private sectors function very differently,
particularly with respect to procurement. Traditionally, if the CIA had a
need for which private-sector assistance was required, the Agency would
initiate a bidding process.162 The winning bidder would earn the contract
and deliver the product. The product would eventually become obsolete, at
which time a new process would begin again. With the creation of In-QTel, the CIA aimed to establish a more efficient procurement process. A
case study endorsed by In-Q-Tel163 states: “As its primary goal, In-Q-Tel
[seeks] to provide the CIA with solutions that [will] be supported by a
competitive marketplace, not government funding.”164 Thus, the objective
is to foster procurement relationships that are continuous rather than
transactional and to secure technology that will be updated according to the
constantly developing needs of the commercial market rather than the
intermittent needs of a single government agency.
Of course, In-Q-Tel requires funding. Whereas financial venture
capital funds raise money by securing committed capital from passive
investors such as pension funds, In-Q-Tel receives annual funding165 for
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investment purposes of about $37 million166 as part of the CIA’s budget for
the Directorate of Science and Technology.167 While this may seem an odd
use of taxpayer dollars, it fits within the broad discretionary authority
afforded to intelligence operations since 1775.168
An office within the CIA, called the In-Q-Tel Interface Center (QIC),
serves as the link between the CIA and In-Q-Tel.169 QIC communicates
unclassified problem sets to In-Q-Tel,170 for which In-Q-Tel is then charged
with combing the private sector for potential fits with the technologies
being developed by promising start-ups. Typically, In-Q-Tel makes twelve
to fifteen investments per year.171 When In-Q-Tel finds a company that
seems poised to deliver, it will usually invest between $500,000 and $3
million, with about 15-20% of that figure going toward an equity position in
the company and the remaining sum covering licensing agreements and
contracts to develop the company’s technology to fit the specific needs of
the CIA.172
Like other venture capital firms, In-Q-Tel typically assumes an
advisory position on a portfolio company’s board of directors.173 From this
vantage point, In-Q-Tel acts as a general advisor to the company. The
perceived benefit of being an investor in the company rather than simply a
customer is that, if any changes are made to the company or its product(s),
In-Q-Tel will promptly find out. As one of In-Q-Tel’s senior directors put
166
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it in 2004, “When you are [only] a customer, you are often the last to know
anything is going wrong with the company.”174
Ostensibly not-for-profit, any returns In-Q-Tel generates from its
portfolio companies flow back to In-Q-Tel.175 Although In-Q-Tel does not
regularly disclose the financial performance of its portfolio,176 Gilman
Louie stated in late 2005 that the firm had managed a cumulative rate of
return of 26% up to that period.177 When In-Q-Tel realizes a profit from the
exit of a portfolio company, the board of directors may then re-allocate the
funds to new projects.178 As for compensation, between 20 to 40% of an InQ-Tel employee’s salary is put into a mandatory fund; for every three
dollars In-Q-Tel invests, one dollar from the employee fund is also
invested.179 Overall, In-Q-Tel managers are compensated differently than
managers of traditional venture capital funds (which use the 2 and 20
structure described earlier in Part III.A), but they still have a direct stake in
the companies in which In-Q-Tel invests.
In terms of In-Q-Tel’s potential investments, a senior director
explained:
We are out there combing the woods, working with entrepreneurs all
over the United States, and for that matter, even worldwide. We get
business plans in, and we continually evaluate new technologies in a
variety of different areas, of which knowledge management tools are
one, and other technology areas tangential to knowledge
management.180

Since its founding, In-Q-Tel has invested in companies that develop or
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Lerner et al., supra note 162, at 490.
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“In-Q-Tel is a rather secretive group.” Kashmir Hill, How the C.I.A. Perfects its
Social Media Monitoring Technologies, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2010, 10:22 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2010/11/24/how-the-c-i-a-perfects-its-social-mediamonitoring-technologies/.
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Jay Solomon, Investing in Intelligence, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2005, at A4, available
at
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB112649119163137691v3hOitqG_UmQt3vvwFp_B3wWrc4_20060912.html?mod=tff_main_tff_top.
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activities, since 1999 the firm has invested in companies with operations
throughout North America, Europe, and Asia.182
George Tenet, under whose direction In-Q-Tel came to life, reflected
in 2007 that “[t]he In-Q-Tel alliance has put the [CIA] back at the leading
edge of technology, a frontier we never should have retreated from in the
first place.”183 Whether or not this assertion is true, another question
altogether is whether an independent venture capital firm is the best vehicle
to accomplish such a mission.
V. ANALYSIS
The current In-Q-Tel model has been touted as a success. In March
2012, for example, David Petraeus, then Director of the CIA, declared that
“our partnership with In-Q-Tel is essential to helping identify and deliver
groundbreaking technologies with mission-critical applications to the CIA
and to our partner agencies.”184 According to Petraeus, the private sector’s
“ability to rapidly prototype new products and get them to market—
especially our market—is a skill that government simply cannot match.”185
But might the potential risks of In-Q-Tel be greater than the benefits?
The 2001 BENS report concludes the opposite: “In-Q-Tel’s potential
advantage to the CIA outweighs the risk.”186 Yet, this study was performed
with relatively minimal data—In-Q-Tel had existed for only two years at
the time. The study seems to endorse In-Q-Tel more as a novel experiment
than a true success. The study advises: “Except for required audits and
oversight, In-Q-Tel should be allowed to complete its initial business cycle
without additional reviews. A full business case assessment should be
required at the end of the charter agreement [in] July 2004.”187 But the CIA
extended In-Q-Tel’s initial five-year charter without the recommended
study, and since 2001 no independent study or panel has fully assessed InQ-Tel’s successes or reevaluated its potential risks.188 “In-Q-Tel remains an
182

See, e.g., Press Release, In-Q-Tel, Asankya Launches Company at Demo Conference
(Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.iqt.org/press/2008/Asankya_01-28-08.html; Press Release, In-QTel, In-Q-Tel Signs Strategic Agreement with Endeca to Bring Power of Guided Navigation
to Government Agencies (Oct. 7, 2009), https://iqt.org/press/2003/Endeca_10-07-03.html.
183
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David H. Petraeus, Director, Cent. Intelligence Agency,, Remarks by Director David
H. Petraeus at In-Q-Tel CEO Summit (Mar. 1, 2012), available at
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2012-speeches-testimony/in-qtel-summit-remarks.html.
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BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at v.
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Id. at vi.
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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 seemed to garner support for In-Q-Tel;
perhaps the War on Terror has caused Congress to leave In-Q-Tel alone for the time being.
See Cortese, supra note 141, at BU1; Lerner et al., supra note 162, at 490.
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experiment,” reported the Washington Post in 2005, “that even its most
ardent backers say has yet to prove its full potential.”189 A follow-up study,
similar to the BENS report, would help add some objectivity to the
discussion. Indeed, “little is publicly known about In-Q-Tel, or about how
the CIA defines ‘success’.”190 A recent article in the Virginia Law Review
concluded: “Given the scarcity of publicly available information, it is
difficult to say anything definitive as to whether the enterprise is truly
effective, let alone more effective than were it housed entirely within the
spy agency.”191
This Part proceeds by examining various issues associated with the
effectiveness of the current In-Q-Tel model. It then suggests an alternative
model by which the CIA may maintain or increase the effectiveness of InQ-Tel while reducing potential risks.
A. Internal Issues: Staffing and Technology Integration
1. Staffing In-Q-Tel and QIC
In-Q-Tel still faces many of the same practical issues that existed when
it opened for business in 1999, including recruiting, hiring, and retaining
talent. For a potential candidate, In-Q-Tel has the advantage of what one
commentator has described as the “sexy CIA-Silicon Valley
combination”192—an angle played up by the CIA with firm’s reference to
the character known as “Q” from the James Bond franchise. But
compensation might be another story. “Bright young people . . . go to
Silicon Valley and get a whole load of stock options,” observed Norman
Augustine, the former CEO of Lockheed Martin who was recruited by the
CIA to help form In-Q-Tel.193 Augustine also noted: “The CIA doesn’t give
stock options.”194
In fact, In-Q-Tel appears to pay195 more than the federal government196
189
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Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National
Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801, 816 (2011).
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Id. at 817.
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Gordon, supra note 137, at S11.
193
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http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arSqdOLQVK9g.
194
Id.
195
IN-Q-TEL
FORM
990
FOR
2010,
available
at
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/522/522149962/522149962_201103_990.
pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). “The compensation system is approved by the board or a
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but significantly less than many leading venture capital firms. The most
recently available public filings show that, for 2010, In-Q-Tel’s CEO
earned total compensation (including bonuses) of $965,023.197 The firm’s
managing partner earned slightly less: $870,094.198 Compensation dropped
considerably, however, for In-Q-Tel’s chief financial officer, who earned
$473,447.199 On the other hand, a “typical managing partner” at a
successful venture capital firm in Silicon Valley might command between
$1 million to $5 million annually before receiving a bonus, according to a
veteran of that market.200 Notably, while In-Q-Tel employees are
compensated in part with equity holdings in the firm’s portfolio
companies,201 In-Q-Tel’s equity investments are relatively small.202 Thus,
In-Q-Tel employees stand to earn less in the aggregate from a successful
IPO or sale of a portfolio company than do employees of other venture
capital firms.203
With this in mind, why would an ideal candidate choose to join In-QTel as opposed to a leading venture capital firm? Perhaps the candidate
might have the opportunity to participate at a higher level earlier at In-QTel, or perhaps the candidate would prefer In-Q-Tel out of a sense of
national service. Certainly, individuals capable of commanding extremely
high compensation in the private sector have opted instead for government
service. One prominent example is Robert S. McNamara, who left his job
as president of Ford Motor Company to serve as Secretary of Defense under

program and other employee benefits are comparable to the high-tech and other appropriate
markets.” Id. at 34. Finally, the committee “determines, with input from the CIA, an overall
annual company ‘performance score’ that reflects the extent and manner in which [In-Q-Tel]
has been successful in pursuing its mission.” Id.
196
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very small.” Lerner et al., supra note 162, at 495.
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As discussed, In-Q-Tel’s fund has historically been less than $50 million. See supra
note 166 and accompanying text. Compare this to the funds managed by Andreessen
Horowitz, a venture capital firm also focused on Silicon Valley. See Evelyn M. Rusli,
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President John F. Kennedy.204
In-Q-Tel seems to have recruited the first group of employees on the
CIA-Silicon Valley combination, plus a sense of national service.205
Augustine, the founding chairman from Lockheed Martin, and Louie, the
founding CEO who had been a successful entrepreneur, were independently
wealthy when they signed up. But Louie, having served as CEO since the
formation of In-Q-Tel in 1999, left in January 2006 to form a new venture
capital firm “to invest in early-stage technology companies.”206 While
Louie’s work thus remains much the same, one can only speculate his
compensation has increased. After Louie’s departure, In-Q-Tel seemed to
have trouble finding a successor. In-Q-Tel initially recruited Amit Yoran to
serve as CEO, but Yoran’s tenure lasted only four months.207 Scott Yancey
served as interim CEO until Christopher Darby, who had previously been
with Intel, took over as CEO in September 2006.208 Darby has been with
In-Q-Tel since then.209
As the initial glamour of the CIA-Silicon Valley combination begins to
wane, In-Q-Tel’s sub-market compensation,210 relative to other venture
204
McNamara discussed Kennedy’s recruiting of him in a 2003 documentary: “I was the
first president . . . in the history of the company . . . other than a member of the Ford family.
And after five weeks, I quit.” THE FOG OF WAR: ELEVEN LESSONS FROM THE LIFE OF ROBERT
S. MCNAMARA (Sony Pictures Classics 2003). Commenting on the economics of his
decision, McNamara said:

My total net worth at the time was on the order of $800,000, but I had huge
unfulfilled stock options worth millions. And I was one of the highest paid
executives in the world, and the future was of course brilliant. . . [My wife and I]
called our children in. Their life would be totally changed. The salary of a cabinet
secretary then was $25,000 a year.
Id. When Kennedy introduced McNamara in a televised press conference, he declared: “Mr.
McNamara leaves the presidency of the Ford Company at great personal sacrifice.” Id.
205
They almost certainly did not sign up with In-Q-Tel in order to make a lot of money,
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(July
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capital firms,211 may reduce the overall talent In-Q-Tel is able to acquire.
As Louie himself put it, “The most important thing [for In-Q-Tel] is the
technology return. Of secondary importance is the financial return.”212
Even if financial return were the most important thing for In-Q-Tel, the firm
would not be able to compete on the same footing as many other venture
capital firms. Often, the funds managed by leading venture capital firms
exceed $100 million of committed capital,213 and many exceed $1 billion.214
In-Q-Tel, on the other hand, operates with far less capital. Investment
opportunities and aggregate returns are therefore restrained, possibly
reducing the interest levels of potential employees.
2. Technology Integration at the CIA
Beyond the practical issues surrounding the operation of In-Q-Tel
itself, further issues exist with respect to the successful integration of
technologies generated by In-Q-Tel’s portfolio companies. The conclusion
of the 2001 BENS report is illustrative. The CIA’s Director, it noted, “must
make the CIA leadership accountable for encouraging and nurturing a
cultural change that accepts solutions from the ‘outside world’.”215
Apparently, this had been a struggle. But acceptance of solutions delivered
by In-Q-Tel is not the only problem. QIC—the CIA department charged
with serving as the liaison between In-Q-Tel and the CIA—is an
administrative layer through which In-Q-Tel’s technologies must move to
reach the larger CIA.216 The right staffing of QIC is therefore critical to the
ultimate success of In-Q-Tel’s investments.217 Unfortunately, the initial
government contractors, and venture capital. Id. Cash bonuses, which are based largely on
individual performance, are calculated as a percentage of base salaries. Id. The investment
program allows In-Q-Tel employees to benefit directly from the IPO or sale of a portfolio
company. Id. at 44.
211
See CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 93, at 129–61 (discussing various compensation
structures among venture capital firms).
212
Nicholas Johnston, Intelliseek Gains $1.4 Million From CIA-Backed Firm, WASH.
POST, June 25, 2001, at E05.
213
CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 93, at 4.
214
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 92, at 1–15.
215
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at v.
216
Concerns about the proper functioning of QIC have existed since the formation of InQ-Tel. “In 1999, Congress believed that In-Q-Tel’s biggest obstacle would not be to find or
invest in technologies, but to transfer In-Q-Tel’s technology to [CIA] users.” Lerner et al.,
supra note 162, at 493.
217
See BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 23 (“Individuals interviewed by the [BENS] Panel
expressed concerns about the structure of QIC and its personnel experience set. Some
suggested that QIC be staffed with employees having a strong IT background, while others
recommended QIC be staffed with those having significant Agency experience and capable
of speaking for their organizational sponsors. The Panel concluded that QIC needs an
appropriate mix of both.”).
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CIA employees charged with running QIC apparently viewed the
assignment as less than “career enhancing.”218 Attracting the right people
to a department with such a reputation would, of course, be difficult.
Whether the CIA resolved the staffing issues with QIC since the 2001
BENS report suggested the problem is unclear.219 Apparently the CIA
attempted to address the problem in 2000, when it sent the original group of
QIC staff on a team-building retreat. The Washington Post reported, rather
dryly: The members of QIC “built rope bridges and hauled each other over
rivers. At night, to loosen things up, they all wore Hawaiian shirts.”220 But
a corporate-style team-building retreat might be an ill-suited remedy.
Perhaps the awkward, unaddressed issue is that QIC is staffed by CIA
employees who are paid significantly less than their counterparts at In-QTel—this disparity may negatively affect cooperation between QIC and InQ-Tel.
While the image of CIA employees wearing Hawaiian shirts on a
team-building retreat may be somewhat humorous, this speaks to another,
basic point: the CIA is not a for-profit organization. Subjecting CIA
employees to programs inspired by corporate America may well fail.
Indeed, during his tenure as Director, George Tenet observed the CIA was
“an organization that seemed to pride itself on its unbusinesslike
methods.”221 Concerned with this attitude, Tenet hired a former executive
from an investment bank to bring “business savvy” to the CIA.222 “I was no
Jack Welch and I knew it,” remarked Tenet, referring to the well-known
former Chairman and CEO of General Electric.223 The comment of a
former CIA employee, who in fact supported the In-Q-Tel experiment, is
illustrative. “The CIA’s mission was intelligence collection and analysis,”
he wrote, “not IT innovation.”224 Of course, innovations delivered by In-QTel’s portfolio companies will never assist the CIA with its mission if QIC
does not function properly and efficiently.
B. External Issues: International Security and Foreign Entanglements
As the U.S. government’s principal spy agency, the CIA has long been
exposed to issues of public international law. Most recently, the CIA’s use
of unmanned drones in targeted killings has implicated questions of
territorial sovereignty and the laws of war.225
218
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In-Q-Tel, on the other hand, takes the CIA beyond public international
law. In-Q-Tel’s investments in private-sector firms expose In-Q-Tel, and
vicariously the CIA, to issues arising from contract disputes, patent rights,
and securities laws.226 Indeed, in a 2005 article, BusinessWeek noted In-QTel “is always walking a fine line between the public and private sector.”227
For example, in 2006 In-Q-Tel invested in a data management firm whose
operations included Chicago, Toronto, London, and Sydney.228 Canadian
hospitals used the firm’s software to track patients’ medical records.
Prompted by concern the CIA may somehow have obtained access to these
records, the provincial government in Ontario investigated the In-Q-Tel
investment.229 “Canadians can rest easy,” remarked the Washington Post at
the conclusion of the investigation, “[t]he CIA is not using its venture
capital arm to snoop into the medical records of our northern neighbors.”230
Future exchanges may not end so amicably. What would happen, for
instance, if the company were to have been supplying records-tracking
software to clients in China? It is unclear that disputes or investigations
would be contained with In-Q-Tel alone. Notably, while In-Q-Tel is
chartered as a corporation independent from the government, QIC occupies
an observer role on the In-Q-Tel board of directors231 and thereby exerts
control over the firm. Indeed, before investing in a target company, In-QTel “considers [QIC’s] insight.”232 Further, In-Q-Tel’s primary client and
source of funds is the CIA.233 It is thus entirely possible that the CIA and
larger U.S. federal government would be approached by concerned foreign
governments or private-sector companies with respect to investment
decisions made by In-Q-Tel. This could cause serious foreign relations
issues with nations that may have good reason to believe the CIA is using
(2009).
226
See generally CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 93, at 51–57, 464–65 (discussing
general issues associated with resolving contract disputes among venture capital firms and
entrepreneurs in an international context).
227
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228
Press Release, Globe Newswire, Initiate Systems’ Software Ranked EMPI Category
Leader by KLAS Enterprises, LLC (Dec. 29, 2008), http://globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2008/12/29/390285/156904/en/Initiate-Systems-Software-Ranked-EMPI-CategoryLeader-by-KLAS-Enterprises-LLC.html (discussing the geographical operations of Initiate
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In-Q-Tel as a platform for espionage rather than R&D.
Recent political angling in South Korea further highlights this point.
In February 2012, a South Korean newspaper revealed that “Kim Jeonghun, nominee for Minister of Future Creation and Science, sat on an
advisory committee for the US Central Intelligence Agency in 2009.”234
The article pointed out that “[t]he news comes on the heels of revelations
that Kim also served as a director for In-Q-Tel, a company established by
the CIA in 1999.”235 This information prompted one South Korean
politician to declare that President-elect Park Geun-hye “needs to explain
why she nominated [Kim] as Minister of Future Creation and Science while
knowing his background.”236 As the newspaper explained, “The concern is
what position Kim, who has expressed strongly patriotic sentiments toward
the [United States], might take in the event of a conflict between that
country’s interests and South Korea’s if he serves as a Cabinet minister.”237
Another scenario to consider is the possibility of In-Q-Tel being
targeted for purposes of industrial espionage. If a foreign firm were to
succeed in stealing trade secrets from In-Q-Tel or one of its portfolio
companies, to what extent would the CIA or larger federal government
become involved? As one CIA official observed: “The open affiliation
between the CIA and In-Q-Tel undoubtedly attract[s] the interests of
foreign persons, some with questionable motives.”238 However, the CIA
ultimately determined “the risks are manageable and, in many ways, are
similar to those faced by any high-tech company trying to protect its
[intellectual property] and trade secrets.”239 Commenting around the time
of In-Q-Tel’s formation, the CIA official emphasized: “In-Q-Tel and the
Agency will be working closely to ensure [In-Q-Tel] operates with a high
degree of security awareness and support.”240
While on the one hand the increasing interconnectedness of the
world241 has blurred the distinction between public and private international
law, the entry of the U.S. government via the CIA and In-Q-Tel into the
world of venture capital marks a significant—perhaps unprecedented—
mixing of the public and private sectors. When In-Q-Tel takes an equity
stake in a company with operations outside the United States, should
234
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foreign governments be concerned about the CIA’s role in the exchange?
The answer is unclear, but certainly this issue merits greater attention than it
has received thus far.
C. Recommendations
Structuring venture capital activity within the private sector is
challenging enough; it becomes a different matter altogether when the
government is involved. A 2002 article by Harvard professor Josh Lerner
asked whether government involvement with venture capital may ever be
successful. His somewhat optimistic conclusion: “Certainly, this possibility
is not implausible.”242 On the other hand, Stanford professor Ronald Gilson
concluded such collaboration is ultimately fruitless. “The U.S. venture
capital market developed organically,” argued Gilson, “largely without
government assistance and certainly without government design.”243 At the
very least, another independent report on In-Q-Tel’s activities would help
shed light on some of the issues addressed above. As discussed, the followup report recommended by BENS in 2001 was never made.
Beyond a follow-up report, the CIA should restructure the In-Q-Tel
model to limit its exposure to private sector disputes. Gilman Louie
correctly surmised that “[i]f we want a CIA that performs better, we’ll need
to take more risks—and give our government the freedom to fail.”244 But
the potential for CIA involvement in major disputes arising from In-Q-Tel’s
investments is a failure that should be deemed an unnecessary risk.
As an alternative to the current model, In-Q-Tel should discontinue
making equity investments245 and instead use its funds solely to cover
licensing agreements and to pay for contracts to develop technology to fit
the specific needs of the CIA. Such activity covers the majority of what InQ-Tel already does, and cutting out the equity investments would
drastically reduce the CIA’s exposure to private-sector disputes. While it
may be true that “the best software around is more likely to be developed in
Silicon Valley than in the Pentagon,”246 such a modified arrangement would
retain the CIA-Silicon Valley relationship but with a reduced level of risk.
Further, In-Q-Tel’s equity investing—the riskiest component of the
current model—is also the firm’s least effective service to portfolio
companies. A recent survey of thirty-four of In-Q-Tel’s portfolio
companies revealed that “[o]nly roughly a third of surveyed In-Q-Tel
companies indicated that the equity investment was highly or extremely
242
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important for developing their technology.”247 The survey results showed
that:
[M]ore than half of the companies found equity investments to be the
least valuable asset of their interactions with In-Q-Tel. Furthermore,
59 percent of companies reported that they were very likely to have
received sufficient funding for their business ventures without any
In-Q-Tel investment. Given that In-Q-Tel is not focused on financial
gains, these results question whether equity investments are a crucial
part of the In-Q-Tel process. Indeed, some interviewed companies
observed that In-Q-Tel seemed insistent on an equity investment . . .
even if the company was not particularly interested in it.248

In addition to discontinuing In-Q-Tel’s equity investing activities, the
CIA should remove QIC from the observer seat on In-Q-Tel’s board.
Granting greater autonomy to In-Q-Tel will create further distance between
the firm and the CIA, which may reduce the suspicions of foreign
governments and companies. Moreover, since the CIA employees of QIC
appear to have no background or expertise with the “extremely
challenging”249 activity of venture capital investing (or contracting with
private companies for the acquisition of various technologies), it is not clear
that their involvement at this level with In-Q-Tel is necessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
The CIA should be congratulated for spearheading a bold and
innovative new approach to its mission, but In-Q-Tel has much to prove
before it may be deemed a success. While collaboration between the R&D
efforts of the public and private sectors is indeed vital and should be
encouraged, the risks of In-Q-Tel’s government-sponsored equity
investments in private companies outweigh the benefits. Gilman Louie got
it right when he said “[t]he CIA and the rest of the government need to
catch the entrepreneurial, risk-taking spirit that’s driving the Silicon Valley
technology revolution.”250 It is not clear, however, such a spirit should be
embodied in a government-sponsored venture capital firm.251 Accordingly,
247
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the recommendations of this Comment suggest a framework by which InQ-Tel may continue to contribute to the CIA, but with a reduced level of
risk.

whereas [government venture capital] programs are primarily driven by strategic concerns.”
Mara, supra note 6, at 11.
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